This paper studies the evolution of the stock market, the dynamics of the ownership structure of traded firms, the birth of pyramidal groups, and the growth and decline of families in Italy. For these purposes, it uses a unique data set, covering all companies traded on the Milan stock exchange during the Twentieth century. The stock market evolved over time according to a nonmonotonic pattern: it was relatively more developed at the beginning and at the end than in the middle of the century. Similarly, ownership structure was more diffused in 1947 and in 2000 than in 1987. Moreover, family-controlled groups and pyramids were less common in 1947 and in 2000 than in 1987. These findings are inconsistent with the view that stock market development and ownership concentration are a monotonic function of investor protection.
Introduction
From an Anglo-Saxon perspective, no country more than Italy epitomizes family capitalism. The image of a group of companies controlled and managed by a family via a complex chain of holding companies contrasts sharply with traditional view on US-style corporations -characterized by professional chief executive officers hired by thousands of small anonymous shareholders.
1 However, this has not always been the case. At the beginning of the Twentieth century an observer would have seen very little difference between the largest Italian firms and Anglo-Saxon firms of today. At that time, the largest companies on the Italian stock market were widely held financial groups (e.g. Banca
Commerciale, a large universal bank with holdings in many industrial sectors) and conglomerates (e.g.
Edison, with activities concentrated in the electricity sector, and Montecatini, operating in mining and steel). In these companies, as in many today's US corporations, managers had vast power and shareholders little incentive to monitor. Among the ten largest companies on the stock market in 1930, there was just one family-controlled company -the FIAT group controlled by the Agnelli family.
This paper studies the forces that brought managerial capitalism to an end and explains how family capitalism emerged.
We argue that the roots of Italian Capitalism as it appears nowadays are to be found in the State's reaction to the Great Depression. Before 1930s, the involvement of the government in the stock market had been very limited. It mainly acted through the central bank whenever there was the need to bail out a bank in crisis. The Great Depression saw government intervention on a much larger scale. The economic crisis led to the collapse of the three main universal banks, Banca Commerciale, Credito
Italiano and Banco di Roma. In 1933 Fascists, then in power, created a public agency, Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI), to manage the large portfolio of companies previously controlled by the three banks.
From then on the state kept a direct presence in the economy as the owner of profit-oriented firms.
With the advent of the Republic in 1946, its role in the economy grew even larger. Instead of limiting its actions to bailing out troubled companies, the government started acquiring sound companies and making direct investments in all industrial sectors. A second public agency, Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI) was created in 1952 to coordinate the state companies operating in the chemical, oil and mining sectors. IRI and ENI became the largest and most influential economic forces in the country.
This direct intervention of the state as entrepreneur largely replaced and crowded out the role of the private sector in the accumulation of capital. This is at odds with the experience of other countries (such as the United States), where the government faced similar challenges but chose to intervene as a regulator of capital markets rather than as their substitute. Italian legislators did not consider the improvement of investor protection necessary for Italy, where the State had taken a direct and massive role in allocating capital. The single regulatory intervention spurred by the Crisis was the Bank Law of 1936 prohibiting universal banks, which had been largely responsible for the stock market growth of the beginning of the century. Later on, the Italian government allowed the creation of one investment bank, Mediobanca, which enjoyed monopoly power and control over the financing decisions of all major groups. In an environment with no regulatory reforms and frequent direct intervention by the state, the Italian stock market declined in the 1950s and 1960s to a level of activity lower than in the early Twentieth century.
With low investor protection and underdeveloped capital markets new entrepreneurs found very expensive to go public. Conversely, incumbent groups were able to thrive by allying themselves with politicians. During the Fascist regime, autarchy protected them from foreign imports. By the post-war period, family capitalism was firmly in control. Big families enjoyed both economic and political power. This power passed on from generation to generation. New public-traded family groups emerged only rarely and always thanks to strong political connections. In this framework, the majority of Italian firms stayed away from the stock market, were closely held by the founders' families and operated in niches and at a relatively small scale.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 briefly describes the institutional framework, focusing specifically on the legal and the political environment. In Section 3, we focus on the evolution of the stock market and we study the dynamics of the ownership structure of traded firms. The birth of pyramidal groups and the growth and decline of families are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 contains the conclusion.
Institutional framework

The legal environment
Over the sample period analyzed in this paper, the legal environment in Italy and, consequently, the degree of investor protection afforded by the law have changed considerably. -samples, 1900-1941, 1942-1973 and 1974-2000, characterized by increasing degree of investor protection.
In the first sub-sample, the stock market was virtually self-regulated. Firms could issue shares with multiple votes and use cross-shareholdings without limitation. Banks were allowed (until the Bank Law of 1936) to own industrial companies, lend money at short-and long-term, underwrite security issues, and hold deposits. Effectively, banks served the role of today's venture capitalists, investment and commercial banks. There was only one bankruptcy procedure, which consisted of a straight liquidation.
Although firms could enjoy limited liability, only a few large firms were taking advantage of it by becoming a corporation (società anonima). There were no rules describing the extent of information disclosure provided to shareholders; nor there was a legal requirement specifying the extent of financial disclosure. In summary, the body of law until 1942 was appropriate for a non-industrialized country with a small number of firms organized either as personal enterprise or partnership.
During the entire second period (1942 -1973) , traded companies and financial markets were regulated uniquely by the laws introduced at the beginning of the period, under the Fascist regime. The
Civil and Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Law of 1942, and the Bank Law of 1936 were the main visible outcomes of the intense law-making activity of this period. These laws introduced requirements on shareholders rights in limited-liability companies. Shareholders were given the explicit right to vote at the annual shareholder meeting and approve the company's annual report and directors.
Companies were required to provide some minimal amount of information on their performance in annual reports for shareholders. The Bankruptcy Law allowed the possibility of reorganization as an alternative to straight liquidation. The Bank Law prohibited universal banking. Banks could not hold equity stakes in non-financial firms. Commercial banks could only engage in short term lending. Only a few state-controlled organizations could provide medium-and long-term financing. Only a newly created bank (Mediobanca) was allowed to operate as an investment bank.
This set of laws, which was designed for a small economy in which the capital markets had a marginal role, gradually became obsolete and incapable to cope with the needs of a developed country competing internationally. For instance, the company law did not draw any distinction between traded and non-traded companies imposing the same set of rules to both. Hence, there were no specific rules regarding information disclosure by a traded company, nor any specific agency in charge of the supervision of the stock market. In theory, the stock market was free to set its own rules, but without any enforcement power, it was effectively unregulated.
In 1974, the legislature finally broke its thirty-years long neglect of the stock market by creating Consob, the agency in charge of supervising the stock market, and by drafting a set of disclosure requirements explicitly created for traded companies. The Consob was modeled on the Security Exchange Commission in the US. It took a year to define its powers and another year to become operational. It took much more time, for the power and relevance of Consob to become real.
At the same time, the legislators drafted specific requirements for traded companies to stimulate investment in the stock market by the general public. Disclosure requirements were introduced for these purposes in 1974 and traded companies were allowed to issue non-voting shares (savings shares).
These shares do not give the owner any voting right, but entitle him or her to a higher dividend than dividend on ordinary shares. As suggested by their name, savings shares were deemed appropriate for unsophisticated investors. In 1975, external auditing of the balances of traded companies was imposed as a requirement and new accounting rules were introduced for statements of financial companies, banks and insurance companies.
The major force of change in the Italian legislation in recent years has certainly been the European Commission's effort to harmonize the legislation of European countries. Several EC directives introduced important changes, such as the requirement of consolidated balances for groups (in 1991) and the Law on Takeovers (in 1992). At the same time, the European Commission pushed for the entry of institutional investors such as mutual funds (in 1983) that were absent from the market before and imposed better disclosure requirements for companies offering securities (regulation by Consob in 1991 and 1992). These requirements increased the transparency of the ownership structure of traded companies. Since 1992, the acquisition of a share larger than 2% of the voting rights of a traded company must be reported to Consob within 48 hours from the event.
Even with these important improvements, in 1994 Italy still ranked among the countries with lowest legal protection for investors among the industrialized countries, according to La Porta et al. (1998) . Antidirector rights, their index of shareholder protection, equals 1 out of 6 for Italy. The reason is that the legislation did not sufficiently protect small shareholders from expropriation by controlling blockholders. In fact, the regulation of groups of companies and the takeover law both contained loopholes such as the limited protection offered to the owners of non-voting shares. Moreover, minority shareholders had too little power to protect themselves. For example, 20 percent of the capital was needed to call a shareholder meeting, which is a very high threshold. Shares had to be deposited in a bank to vote. There was no vote by mail, which made it costly for small shareholders to vote.
In 1998, important steps were taken towards better legal protection for investors with the so-called
Legge Draghi (Draghi's law) from the name of its leading drafter. If evaluated in terms of the index of shareholder protection developed by La Porta et al. (1998) , the impact of this law was an improvement in shareholder protection from 1 to 5. Specifically, the threshold to call a shareholder meeting was reduced to 10 percent; the loopholes in the takeover law were corrected; and minority shareholders were given more rights to voice their opinions.
These regulatory changes were reflected into real changes. 
The political environment
The political environment has also changed considerably over the Twentieth century. Since then, the State in Italy has maintained a direct presence in the economy as the owner of profit-oriented firms. With the advent of the Republic, the role of the State in the economy grew larger.
Instead of being limited to bailing out troubled companies, the State started acquiring sound companies and directly investing in all sectors. A second agency, named Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (Eni), was created in 1952 to coordinate the state companies operating in the chemical, oil and mining sectors.
Other institutes were created in 1962 (Efim) and in 1972 (Gepi) to direct state intervention in the southern part of Italy. All these agencies were independent of one another, and, in principle, managed as profit-oriented corporations, although they could rely on financial help from the Treasury if in need.
Iri and Eni were the largest and certainly most important of these organizations. Their presidents were very powerful personalities with large opportunities to enjoy and take advantage of their power.
2
The most dramatic event for the Italian economy in the second half of the sample was the nationalization of the electrical industry. Such a decision was entirely political. To understand this move, it is useful to point out that the Christian Democrats, in power since the end of the war, had seen their share of electoral consensus steadily decrease from 49% in 1948 to around 38% in 1958. To retain power, after failing to attract less extreme parties, the government had to resort to attracting the Socialist Party with around 8% of the votes in 1962. As a condition of their coalition support, socialists required the nationalization of the electric industry. 3 The plan for nationalization was adopted on June 17 th 1962 and became law on December 12 th 1962. According to this plan, the State had to pay the companies and leave the decisions about the future of the companies to their shareholders.
4
The 1962 nationalization had important implications for the stock market and the entire economy.
The electrical groups had a crucial role in the stock market: they not only represented around one third of the total market capitalization, but they were a nucleus of economic and political power to a large extent free of government control. The first effect of the nationalization was a sequence of mergers inside these groups, later followed by mergers among these groups. The payments obtained from the nationalization were invested rather than paid out to shareholders. With few good projects available, most of the resources in the hands of private entrepreneurs were channeled towards the chemical industry, giving birth to Montedison, which soon came under government control (Eni). Time revealed that investing in the chemical industry was not a good idea in a country with limited natural resources.
Therefore, the financial resources provided by the government as a compensation for the forced nationalization ended up almost entirely wasted.
Stock market and ownership structure
Recent research shows that the Italian corporate governance regime exhibits low legal protection for investors and poor legal enforcement (La Porta, et al., 1998) , underdeveloped equity markets (La Porta, et al., 1997) , pyramidal groups and very high ownership concentration (Barca, et al., 1994) .
Arguably because of these institutional characteristics, private benefits of control are high (Zingales, 1994) , and minority shareholders are often expropriated (Bragantini, 1999, and Volpin, 2002) . In this paper we examine how such a poor corporate governance regime could emerge.
In the first section, we focus on the evolution of the institutional and political environment affecting the stock market. In the second one, we study the development of the ownership structure of traded companies.
Evolution of the stock market
Figure 1 plots the number of companies traded on the Milan stock exchange, the main Italian stock exchange, over the Twentieth century as a raw number and as a fraction of the population (in millions).
La Porta, et al. (1997) suggest that the latter measure is a good indicator of stock market development.
The figure shows a highly non-monotonic pattern of development. The strong growth of the beginning of the century lasted until 1914 and was followed by a slow decline until the middle of the Seventies and a substantial growth since then. 5 A similar non-monotonic pattern is shown in Figure 2 where the total market capitalization as a percentage of the gross national products is plotted over time. In this case, there are many peaks. These correspond to the periods of strong market enthusiasms as shown by the time-series of the stock market index (dotted line). How can one explain this pattern?
According to La Porta, et al. (1998) , stock market development should be positively correlated with shareholder protection. The intuition is that investors are not willing to provide equity to finance a firm unless they are confident of receiving a fair return from their investment. If shareholder protection is low, minority shareholders require a high return from their investment to compensate them for the high risk of expropriation by the management/controlling shareholder. Hence, external finance is costly and fewer companies go public. Consistent with this prediction, La Porta, et al. (1997) find that in the Nineties countries with stronger shareholder protection are characterized by larger stock markets. 6 This finding is about a cross-section of countries but should also hold with time-series data about a single country.
To test this prediction we compare the stock market development across the three sub-samples identified in section 2.1, which display significant differences in investor protection. As discussed Table 2 , the dummies for the periods with lowest and highest investor protection are both positive and statistically significant. This implies that the subsample 1942 -1973 is characterized by higher investor protection but lower stock market development than the sub-sample 1900 -1941. The comparison between the second (1942 -1973) and third (1974 -2000) sub-samples is instead fully consistent with the theory: higher investor protection goes together with more financial development. In column 2, we add the stock market index to control for firms' opportunism in their decision to go public. 7 The results are even stronger in this case because only the period with lowest investor protection is characterized by higher stock market development than the rest. In columns 3 and 4, we use the market capitalization as a percentage of GNP as an alternative measure of stock market development. The results in column 3 indicate that there is no significant difference in stock market development across the three sub-samples. When we add stock market index, in column 4, we find that the period 1900-1941 (with the lowest investor protection of all) is characterized by higher stock market development than the remaining years. Overall, the findings in Table 2 suggest that there is no monotonic relationship between investor protection and stock market development.
These results suggest that the law and finance view cannot offer a satisfactory explanation of the pattern of development of the Italian stock market. It is important to mention a caveat to this conclusion. Indeed, one may object that this is not a correct test of the law and finance approach. The reason is that with time-series data on one country only we are effectively holding legal origin constant.
If the country's legal origin really matters rather than the degree of investor protection, the law and finance view would have no testable prediction on the evolution of the Italian stock market. If so, a satisfactory test comes only with panel data on a set of countries. Following this approach, Rajan and Zingales (2002) are able to reject the law and finance view. The finding in this section simply confirms their result for Italy.
An important missing variable in the regressions reported in Table 2 is politics. A growing literature has argued that financial development is the outcome of ideology and the economic interests of voters and pressure groups. Rajan and Zingales (2002) argue that the stock market can be fostered or hampered by government action depend upon the balance of powers between pressure groups. Pagano and Volpin (2001) and Biais and Perotti (2002) argue that state intervention in the economy should be negatively correlated with financial development, because the state acts as a substitute for financial markets. One proxy for the government's intervention in the economy is the number of governmentcontrolled companies on the stock market as a percentage of the total number of traded companies.
With this proxy, the testable prediction of the political economy theories is that financial development should be negatively related to government ownership of companies. In Table 3 we combine the two theories in one specification. Across all columns, the political variable has the predicted negative sign and is statistically significant Overall, Table 3 suggests that politics is an important variable to affect stock market development and confirms the results in Table 2 that stock market development is not a monotonic function of investor protection.
Evolution of the ownership structure of firms
As shown by Barca, et al. (1994) and La Porta, et al. (2000) , the Italian corporate governance system is recently characterized by very high ownership concentration. Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) argue that ownership concentration should characterize countries with low shareholder protection because of the inability of companies to sell equity to minority shareholders when investors are not well protected by the law. Bebchuk (1999) points to the fact that control is valuable in countries with low investor protection and therefore companies are closely held to make sure that control is not contestable. 8 In this section, we explore how ownership concentration has evolved over time.
We have detailed ownership structure on all companies traded on the Milan stock exchange for Overall, Table 4 shows that ownership concentration has not changed significantly over time.
In contrast with what suggested by Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) , the improvement in investor protection has brought about no change in the fraction of widely-held companies, no change in the fraction of voting rights controlled by the ultimate owner, and (if anything) an increase in the fraction of cash-flow rights owned by the ultimate owner. However, these results are consistent with Bebchuk (1999) if we assume that control was equally valuable across time. In other words, the improvement of investor protection has not affected the value of control. 
Pyramidal groups and family capitalism
The image of a group of companies controlled and managed by a family via a complex chain of holding companies is what most observers associate with Italian capitalism. In this section, we explore first the birth of pyramidal groups and then the evolution of family-controlled groups.
Pyramids
Figures 4 and 5 describe the evolution of the control of traded companies over time. Firms are classified into six classes of control: first, we distinguish whether the firm is a stand-alone or belongs to a pyramidal group; second, we differentiate between family, widely-held and government-controlled firms. The figures show that stand-alone companies were never more than 30 percent in value and 40 percent in number of all traded companies. It is interesting to observe that from the Great Depression on, the importance of widely-held pyramids steadily declined. This trend has been reverted only recently with the government's program of privatization. Government-and family-controlled pyramids were the groups that gained the most. Wolfenzon (1998) argues that pyramidal groups are created in order to expropriate shareholders and this should happen more often in countries with lower investor protection. Bebchuk, et al. (1999) suggest the same empirical prediction by highlighting that pyramidal groups allow the separation between ownership and control without giving up control, which is a very valuable feature in a country in which control is very valuable. We can test these theories by comparing the degree of separation between ownership and control across the three years. Table 5 shows that the separation of ownership and control and the average pyramidal level were significantly higher in 1987 than in 1947 and in 2000. The findings suggest a strong non-monotonic relationship, which is evidence against the "law and finance" theories.
Families and Power
The three major family-owned companies in 1928 were Pirelli, a rubber and tyre producer owned by the Pirelli family, Italcementi, a producer of cement owned by the Pesentis, and FIAT, a car company owned by the Agnelli family. Their growth largely benefited from the market power enjoyed in their industries. This insulation from foreign competition in their core sector partly continued after the war. Hence, these three major families were able to invest outside their core sectors, acquiring electric companies, real estate firms, banks and insurance companies.
The history of these three family groups is remarkably similar. Pirelli was founded in 1872 by In what follows we present in details the evolution of the Pesentis' group and discuss more in general the fortunes of the other families.
Evolution of the Pesentis' group
The first company of the Pesentis' group, Italcementi, was set up in 1865 by They were all delisted from MSE after merging with their respective holdings in 1996 and 1997. All three buybacks were financed by capital increases and a subsequent swap of shares of holdings and subsidiaries. In 1997 Italcementi increased its presence in the cement industry by buying a controlling stake in cement company Calcemento, a former member of the bankrupt Ferruzzi group. This subsidiary was merged into Italcementi two years later. Franco Tosi was taken private through a share exchange with its parent Italmobiliare the same year. The evolution of the group is summarized in Table 6 .
General findings
In Table 7 , we show the ten largest groups as measured by market capitalization at the end of 1930
and at ten-year intervals until 2000. The table indicates in italics the name of groups controlled by families. As one can immediately see, in 1930 there was only one family-controlled group in the top ten: the Agnellis' group. A large widely-heldinvestment bank, Banca Commerciale, was at the head of the largest group on the stock market. Several management-controlled public conglomerates were at the top of the chart. Among those, Edison was the largest holding company in the electricity sector and
Montecatini controlled mining and steel. In 1940, after the collapse of Banca Commerciale, Iri, the government-controlled agency created in 1933, was the largest group per market capitalization, simply because it had taken over all companies previously controlled by Banca Commerciale. One new family made its appearance in the top ten, the Pirellis.
The presence of family groups in the top ten increases steadily reaching four in 1960: together with Agnellis and Pirellis, we find Pesentis, Olivettis, and the group controlled by the notorious financier Michele Sindona. Family-controlled groups controlled five of the top ten spots from 1970 to 1990. A change in trend is evident in 2000, when only two family-controlled groups were in the top 10, the Agnellis' and the group controlled by Silvio Berlusconi.
This table confirms the view that family capitalism became important in the Fifties and Sixties and seems to have lost some ground in recent years (after 1990) . By contrast, widely-held groups decreased in importance after the Great Depression and even more after the nationalization of the electric industry. The widely-held conglomerates merged together and were taken over by the government.
This trend was reverted in 1980s and 1990s because of the massive privatization program started by the government. In 2000, the top seeds were taken by large financial groups (Generali, Intesa, San Paolo and Unicredito) and by large conglomerates (Olivetti, Eni, Enel, and Montedison). Table 7 also shows the level of concentration of the stock market in the hands of the largest 4 and 10 groups. It is interesting to observe that only in 2000 the stock market has become less concentrated. This is consistent with our finding that the development of the Italian stock market is only a recent phenomenon.
Conclusion
Nowadays, there are signs that Italian capitalism is undergoing an historical transformation. The crisis at FIAT and the recent death of Giovanni II Agnelli symbolize this revolution. But the transformation goes beyond the events in the Agnellis' group. Interestingly, all three major family groups of the past have experienced significant changes in recent years. Pirelli came close to a financial collapse in the 1990s and was rescued by a manager, Marco Tronchetti Provera, who married into Pirelli family and steered the group away from tires towards cables and fiber optics and is now the company's largest shareholder. The Pesentis' group went into financial distress in 1980s and had to refocus on the cement sector by selling all control stakes in banks and insurance companies. The family still controls the group although has lost most of its economic relevance. Finally, the Agnelli group might not survive the current crisis in FIAT.
Since 1980s These changes suggest that Italy may be finally in the process of evolving from family capitalism to managerial capitalism. But the history of Italian capitalism indicates that this revolution might still be stopped and reverted, as it happened in the early Twentieth century. (1947) . For all other years, we have reconstructed the chain of control that ends with the ultimate owner (a family, the state or a widely-held company), where we have used all available source to track all transfers of controls however defined. One limitation of this approach is that the definition of control may vary across sources. However, the information for 1947 suggests that ownership has 10 Mediobanca (1950 10 Mediobanca ( -2000 .
Appendix -Description of the data
11 Credito Italiano (1929 -1931 , 1961 -1972 , 1976 , 1980 . 12 We use an arithmetic average of maximum and minimum market values for the few cases when we are unable to find price data for the year-end.
13 Mediobanca (1983 Mediobanca ( -1997 .
14 Il Sole 24 Ore-SACIP .
always been quite concentrated. Hence, the definition of control may be consistent across sources for most firms. Since we prefer to be conservative in defining control, we assume that control rests in the hands of the most recent controlling shareholder unless we have explicit information otherwise. In some cases our sources describe the control structure as a coalition control or as a widely held company. The first usually corresponds to an agreement by a group of shareholders to exercise relative majority control through coordinated voting of stakes with combined share of votes less than 20%.
There is no controlling shareholders or controlling coalitions in the second case. We do not distinguish the cases of coalition control from the cases of widely held companies in the analysis. An incomplete list of our sources on control is the following: Amatori and Brioschi (1997) , Amatori and Colli (1999) , Barca, Bertucci, Capello, and Casavola (1997) , Brioschi, Buzzacchi, and Colombo (1990) , Chandler, Amatori, and Hikino (1997) , Ciofi (1962) , Colajanni (1991) , Grifone (1945) , Scalfari (1961 ), Scalfari (1963 , Turani (1974), Turani (1980) . Dimson, et al (2001) , it is measured in real term, and is normalized so that it takes value 1 in 1900. OLS regressions: standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
Dependent variable:
Number of traded companies scaled by population
Market capitalization divided by GNP Dimson, et al (2001) , it is measured in real term, and is normalized so that it takes value 1 in 1900. OLS regressions: standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
Dependent variable:
Market capitalization divided by GNP 
